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NOTES
THE TENDER OFFER: IN SEARCH OF A DEFINITION
Congress enacted the Williams Act' in 1968 to amend the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act) 2 for the purpose of regulating substantial
stock acquisitions, including tender offers. 3 Although neither Congress nor
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has defined the term "tender
offer ' 4 by statute, the conventional usage of the term tender offer refers to
a public invitation to all shareholders of a target corporation to tender their
shares for sale at a price above the market price.' Over the years, some
courts and the SEC have supported the expansion of the original understanding of the term tender offer to include certain open market and privately

1. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(e),
n(d)-(f) (1982)). Two of the five provisions that the Williams Act added to the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act) specifically regulate tender offers. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d)-(e)
(1982).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-kk (1982).
3. See infra notes 17-34 and accompanying text (legislative history of the Williams Act).
4. See SEC Securities and Exchange Act Release No. 34-12676 (Aug. 2, 1976), reprinted
in [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 80,659, at 86,695-96 (Proposed Rules
and Schedules For Tender Offers). In 1976, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) stated
that it was unnecessary to define the term tender offer. Id. On later occasions, however, the
SEC drafted two proposed definitions of the term tender offer. See A.L.I. Fed. Sec. Code
§ 292 (1979) (proposing definition of tender offer); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
34-16385 (Nov. 29, 1979), reprintedin [1979-80 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,374
at 82-603 (proposed Rule 14(d)-l(b)(1) defining tender offer). Congress has not adopted either
of the proposed definitions.
5. See S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967) (discussing tender offers)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Report]; H. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in
1968 U.S.CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws 2811, 2811-13 (discussing tender offers) [hereinafter cited
as House Report]. The House and Senate reports on the Williams Act describe a pre-Williams
Act tender offer as an offer to all of a company's shareholders to purchase company's shares
at a price above the market price. House Report, supra, at 2811. The pre-Williams Act tender
offeror usually was under no obligation to purchase shares unless the number of shares tendered
reached a certain specified number. House Report, supra, at 2811. Furthermore, the preWilliams Act tender offeror's identity and purposes often were unknown to the shareholders.
House Report, supra, at 2812; see Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 597 n.22
(5th Cir.) (discussing pre-Williams Act shareholders' need for information when faced with
tender offer), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974). In addition, shareholders who tendered shares
prior to the adoption of the Williams Act relinquished control over these shares until the tender
offer expired, at which time the tender offeror would count the shares tendered and either
purchase a specified amount or return the shares to the shareholders. Smallwood, 489 F.2d at
597 n.22. See Note, The Developing Meaning of 'Tender Offer' Under the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1250, 1251-52 (1973) (explaining characteristics of
conventional tender offers).
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negotiated purchases. 6 Until recently, most courts examining private negotiations and open market activity employed a multifactor test suggested by the
SEC to determine whether specific acquisitions constituted tender offers for
the purposes of the Williams Act. 7 The multifactor test consists of several
indicia that are characteristic of conventional tender offers.' The United

6. See, e.g., Esmark Inc. v. Strode [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,238, at 91,581 (Ky. CT. ApP. 1981) (rapid acquisition of stock through open market and privatelynegotiated stock purchases constituted tender offer); Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783,
823-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (privately negotiated purchases constituted tender offer), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1069 (1983); Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Indus., Inc. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 97,107, at 96,150 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (solicitation of shares from family members
constituted tender offer); S-G Sec., Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1126-27 (D. Mass.
1978) (open market held likely to constitute tender offer); Cattleman's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343
F. Supp. 1248, 1251-52 (W.D. Okla. 1972) (private negotiations for securities purchases constituted tender offer).
7. See, e.g., SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945, 950-52 (9th Cir.
1985) (issuer's repurchase of shares on open market did not constitute tender offer under
multifactor test); Polinsky v. MCA, Inc., 680 F.2d 1286, 1291 (4th Cir. 1982) (open market
and privately negotiated purchases did not constitute tender offer under multifactor test);
University Bank and Trust v. Gladstone, 574 F. Supp. 1006, 1010-11 (D. Mass. 1983) (private
solicitations did not constitute tender offer under multifactor test); Zuckerman v. Franz, 573
F. Supp. 351, 358 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (cash merger proposal did not constitute tender offer under
multifactor test); Astronics Corp. v. Protective Closures Co., Inc., 561 F. Supp. 329, 334-36
(W.D.N.Y. 1983) (private sale held not likely to constitute tender offer under multifactor test);
Ludlow Corp. v. Tyco Labs, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 62, 67 (D. Mass. 1981) (open market and
privately negotiated purchases did not constitute tender offer under multifactor test); Wellman
v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 823-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (privately negotiated purchases
constituted tender offer under multifactor test), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983); Hoover Co.
v. Fuqua Indus., Inc. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,107, AT 96,150
(N.D. OHIo 1979) (private solicitations constituted tender offer under multifactor test).
See also infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text (explaining multifactor test). But see Hanson
Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 57 (2d Cir. 1985) (criticizing multifactor test as not
consistently determinative of whether activity constitutes tender offer); Brascan Ltd. v. Edper
Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (finding multifactor test undersirable
because of test's unpredictability).
8. See Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) In Wellman v.
Dickinson, the SEC suggested, through an amicus curie brief, that courts should consider seven
characteristics usually associated with tender offers in determining whether a particular transaction constitutes a tender offer. Id. at 823. The SEC identified the following seven factors as
indicative of a tender offer: active and widespread solicitation of a corporation's shareholders
for the purpose of acquiring shares in that corporation; solicitation made for a substantial
percentage of the corporation's stock; offer to purchase a corporation's shares from the
shareholders at a premium above the prevailing market price; firm rather than negotiable terms
of the offer; offer contingent on the tender of a certain number of shares; offer open for a
limited time period; and offer that subjects shareholders to selling pressures. Id. at 823-24. The
Wellman court explained that a court should weigh the factors qualitatively and that the
importance of particular factors in a specific transaction depends upon the fact pattern of the
transaction at issue. Id. at 824; see Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Indus., Inc. [1979-1980 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,107, AT 96,148. IN Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Indus. Inc., the
SEC identified as an eighth factor of the multifactor test-an offeror's public announcement
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States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Hanson Trust PLC v.
SCM Corp.9 recently questioned the utility of the multifactor test for
purposes of determining whether certain open market and privately negotiated purchases constitute tender offers and, instead, proposed a shareholder
identification test.' 0 As Hanson Trust and other judicial decisions suggest,

uncertainty exists among courts concerning not only the applicability of the
Williams Act to open market and privately negotiated purchases" but also

the proper test to utilize in determining whether certain activity constitutes
2
a tender offer.'
Although the scope of the Williams Act remains unclear, the specific
purposes of the Williams Act are: to provide a target company's shareholders
3
(target shareholders) with material information about a tender offer,' to
provide target shareholders with time to reach an informed decision about a
tender offer,' 4 and to assure the equal treatment 5 of all target shareholders
throughout the tender offer process.' 6 Prior to the enactment of the Williams

of intent to acquire control of corporation followed by rapid acquisition of large blocks of
corporation's stock. Id.
9. 774 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1985).
10. See id. at 57 (2d Cir. 1985) (arguing that arbitrariness and unpredictability of
multifactor test contribute to inadequacy of multifactor test); infra notes 118-19 and accompanying text (discussing Hanson Trust shareholder identification test).
11. Compare SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945, 950-53 (9th Cir.
1985) (open market purchases may constitute tender offer under multifactor test) with Kennecott
Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1207 (2d Cir. 1978) (open market
purchases not subject to Williams Act tender offer provisions). See Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM
Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 57 (2d Cir. 1985) (private negotiations for purchases may constitute tender
offer if shareholders need information provided by Williams Act); Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Indus.,
Inc. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,107, AT 96,150 (N.D. OHIo 1979)
(private negotiations for stock purchases constituted tender offer if multifactor test met).
12. See Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 57 (2d Cir. 1985) (shareholder
identification test utilized to determine whether privately negotiated transactions constituted
tender offer); SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945, 950-53 (9th Cir. 1985)
(multifactor test utilized to determined whether open market purchases constitute tender offer);
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1207 (2d Cir. 1978) (legislative
history of Williams Act examined to determine whether open market purchases constitute tender
offer); Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Indus., Inc. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,107 at 96,147-49 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (multifactor test utilized to determine whether privately
negotiated solicitations constitute tender offer); S-G Sec. Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp.
1114, 1126-27 (D. Mass. 1978) (publicity preceding purchases of stock examined to determine
whether offer likely to constitute tender offer).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982); see infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text (explaining
disclosure requirements of section 14(d)(1) of the '34 Act).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982); see infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text (explaining
withdrawal rights of shareholders under section 14(d)(5) of the '34 Act and pro-rata acceptance
provisions under section 14(d)(6) of the '34 Act).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1982); see infra note 32 and accompanying text (explaining
equal treatment provisions of section 14(d)(7) of the '34 Act).
16. See House Report, supra note 5, at 2812-14. While the original '34 Act regulated
proxy battles and stock-for-stock exchanges, the '34 Act did not regulate cash tender offers as
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Act, target shareholders faced with tender offers often had no access to
information about the tender offeror or the consequences of accepting the
tender offer. 7 Lacking proper information about the tender offer or tender
offeror, target shareholders often were unable to assess adequately the
reasonableness of an offering price or to determine whether accepting or
rejecting the offer was in the target shareholders' best interest. 8 In addition,
pre-Williams Act tender offers often discriminated against target shareholders
who tendered shares either early or late in the tender offer process. 9 A target
shareholder who tendered shares early in the pre-Williams Act tender offer
process undertook the risk that the original tender offeror or a new tender
offeror would present the target shareholders who had not yet tendered
shares with a more favorable offer than the original offer. 20 Alternatively, a
target shareholder who tendered shares late in the pre-Williams tender offer
process undertook the risk that the tender offeror would reject the offered
shares because the tender offer quota already had been fulfilled. 2' Target shareholders involved in pre-Williams Act tender offers, therefore, often fell victim
to tender offer discrimination regardless of the course of action that the target

a means of gaining corporate control. Id. The framers of the Williams Act recognized that
shareholders in cash tender offer situations need the information and protections that are
accorded to other shareholders involved in other types of battles for corporate control to
determine what activity would best serve the shareholders' interest. Id. Therefore, Congress
enacted the Williams Act to bridge the perceived gap in existing securities laws. Id.
17. See House Report, supra note 5, at 2812 (discussing lack of information available to
shareholders involved in pre-Williams Act tender offers).
18. See Takeover Bids: Hearings on H.R. 14475 Before the Subcom. on Commerce and
Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 12
(1968) (Statement of Hon. Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission)
(discussing need for tender offer regulation) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].The disparity
between the market price and the tender offer price for a specific company's stock often is
misleading. Id. While the market price reflects the value of a stock in a business operating as
a going concern, the value of a stock may increase dramatically through a change in ownership
or through the sale of certain corporate assets. Id. A tender offeror, therefore, often is willing
to pay a shareholder a price above the market price because the tender offeror expects, through
the sale of corporate assets or through other means, to realize a value even greater than the
tender offer price. Id. Although a high tender offer price might appear to be a bargain to the
uninformed target shareholder, the tender offer price often is lower than the actual value of
the share under the tender offeror's plans for the company. Id. Accordingly, without knowledge
of the tender offeror's plans, a target shareholder prior to the Williams Act was unable to make
an informed decision whether to accept or reject a proposed offer. Id.
19. See infra notes 20-26 and accompanying text (explaining hazards of tendering shares
early or late in response to a pre-Williams Act tender offer).
20. See House Hearings,supra note 18, at 11-12. Prior to the enactment of the Williams
Act, a shareholder who tendered shares in response to a tender offer provided the tender offeror
with an option to purchase the shares at a specified price. Id. The shareholder who tendered
shares in response to a pre-Williams Act tender offer thereby relinquished the right to apply
those shares to any subsequent and more lucrative offers which were made for the class of
securities that the shareholder had tendered. See id. (warning that an early tender of shares
may prevent participation in a later offer).
21. House Report, supra note 5, at 2812.
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shareholders chose.? In response to the unequal treatment accorded target

shareholders and the target shareholders' need for time and information
concerning a tender offer, Congress adopted the Williams Act in 1968.23
The Williams Act, in part, added sections 14(d) and 14(e) to the '34 Act
to regulate the tender offer process. 24 Section 14(d)(1) of the '34 Act requires

that any person making a tender offer that would result in that person's
ownership of more than five percent of a class of any registered equity
security must disclose the information specified in section 13(d)(1) of the '34
Act. 25 The information specified in section 13(d)(1) includes the background
and identity of the tender offeror, the source and amount of funds involved

in the purchase, the offeror's present holdings in the target corporation, and
any anticipated change the offeror plans to make in the corporate structure. 26
The purpose of section 14(d)(1) is to provide unsophisticated target shareinformed decisions concernholders with the information necessary to make
27
ing whether to accept or reject a tender offer.

In addition to requiring that a tender offeror disclose material information about a tender offer, section 14(d), and in particular sections 14(d)(5)(7) of the '34 Act, lessens the pressures on target shareholders to tender

shares hastily and, also, prevents a tender offeror from discriminating

amongst target shareholders. 28 Section 14(d)(5) of the '34 Act provides that

target shareholders who tender shares in response to a tender offer may
withdraw those shares during the first seven days of the tender offer and at
any time after the tender offer has been in effect for sixty days. 29 Section
14(d)(5) thereby negates the possibility that target shareholders who tender

22. See supra notes 20 and 21 and accompanying text (discussing dangers of tender offers
to pre-Williams Act target shareholders under alternative courses of action).
23. See House Report, supra note 5, at 2812-14 (explaining purpose of Williams Act);
House Hearings, supra note 18, at 11-12 (same).
24. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e),
n(d)-(f) (1982)).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982). Section 14(d)(l) of the '34 Act requires that the tender
offeror disclose the information specified in section 13(dXl) of the '34 Act to the SEC and the
issuer of the security concurrently with the announcement of a tender offer.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l) (1982). Section 13(d)(l) of the '34 Act specifies the information
that must be disclosed to the issuer, the exchanges where the securities are traded and the SEC
within ten days after a person acquires, by any means, 5% of a class of a corporation's
registered equity securities. Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982). (Section 14(d)(1) requires
disclosure of section 13(d)(1) information in event of tender offer). But see Wall St. J., Jan.
10, 1986 at 36, col. 2. The SEC recently petitioned Congress to amend section 13(d) to require
purchases of 5% of a company's securities to disclose 13(d) information within two business
days of the acquisition. Id.
27. See House Report, supra note 5, at 2813 (discussing Williams Act purpose of providing
full and fair disclosure for benefit of shareholder solicitees); House Hearings,supra note 20, at
13 (same).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5)-(7) (1982); see infra notes 29-33 and accompanying text
(discussing purpose of sections 14(d)(5)-(7) of '34 Act).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982).
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shares will lose complete control over those shares."' Section 14(d)(6) of the
'34 Act requires a tender offeror to take up tendered securities pro rata
according to the number of securities deposited by each target shareholder
during the first ten days of an offer and, thus, diminishes the pressure on
the target shareholders to promptly tender their shares. 3 Section 14(d)(7) of
the '34 Act requires that all target shareholders receive an equal price for
tendered shares, regardless of the order in which the shareholders deposited
their shares. 32 Therefore, sections 14(d)(5)-(7) of the '34 Act reduce the
pressures and prejudices to target shareholders that pre-Williams Act tender
offers traditionally involved. 33 Finally, section 14(e) of the '34 Act serves as
4
a broad antifraud provision in connection with tender offers.1
While the Williams Act amendments to section 14 of the '34 Act appear
straightforward, confusion exists concerning which types of acquisitions
trigger the protection of the Williams Act tender offer provisions." Although
the legislative history of the Williams Act suggests that Congress meant to
regulate only conventional tender offers, 36 some courts and the SEC favor

30. See House Report, supra note 5, at 2820. Section 14(d)(5) of the '34 Act provides a
shareholder with an opportunity to reconsider a tender offer and, also, prevents an unreasonably
lengthy immobilization of shares while the tender offeror considers whether to purchase the
shares. Id.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982) (section 14(d)(6) requires pro-rata acceptance of shares
tendered in response to tender offer only when number of shares desposited during first 10 days
of tender offer is greater than tender offeror is bound or willing to accept); see supra notes 1722 and accompanying text (explaining pre-Williams Act pressures on shareholders to respond
immediately to tender offers).
32, 15 U.S.C, § 78n(d)(7) (1982). See House Report, supra note 5, at 2821. The purpose
of section 14(d)(7) of the '34 Act is to provide fair and equal treatment to all target shareholders
who tender shares in response to a tender offer by ensuring that all shareholder solicitees receive
an equal price for their shares. Id.; see supra note 20 and accompanying text (tender offerors
in pre-Williams Act tender offers could raise tender offer price discriminately in favor of
nontendering target shareholders).
33. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text (explaining sections 14(d)(5)-(7) of the
Williams Act).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982). See House Report, supra note 5, at 2821 (anti-fraud
provision makes unlawful any fraudulent or manipulative acts or practices in regard to tender
offers).
35. Compare Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1207 (2d
Cir. 1978) (open market purchases cannot constitute tender offer) with S-G Sec. Inc. v. Fuqua
Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1126-27 (D. Mass. 1978) (open market purchase found likely to
constitute tender offer); see supra note 12 and accompanying text (explaining that courts use
various tests in determining whether certain activities constitute tender offers).
36. See House Hearings,supra note 18, at 11-12 (describing tender offer as invitation to
stockholders to tender shares in exchange for premium price); House Report, supra note 5, at
2811-13 (same); Senate Report, supra note 5, at 2 (same); supra note 5 (explaining conventional
usage of tern tender offer); see also Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F,2d
1195, 1207 (2d Cir. 1978) (suggesting that Congress meant to regulate only conventional tender
offers through the Williams Act). See generally I M. LIPTON & STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS &
FREEZEOUTs § 2,02 at 2-23 - 2-24 (1986) (suggesting that legislative history and language of
Williams Act indicate that Congress intended Williams Act to apply only to conventional tender
offers). But see ARA!ow, EINHOAtN & BERNSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR
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expansion of the scope of the term tender offer to encompass certain open
market and privately negotiated purchases of securities. 7 The SEC and courts
that favor expansion of the scope of the term tender offer, however, are not
in uniform agreement concerning the proper test to employ in determining
whether particular transactions constitute tender offers." As a result, the
scope of the term tender offer remains an elusive concept.3 9
OPEN MARKET PURCHASES

The legislative history of the Williams Act suggests that Congress did
not intend to regulate any open market purchases of securities as tender
offers.4 Indeed, during the course of congressional hearings on the Williams
Act, speakers specifically distinguished tender offers from open market
purchases and commented upon the need for pre-acquisition disclosure only
in the case of tender offers. 41 Congress recognized that, in contrast to open
market purchases of securities under which the acquisition of control nor-

CORPORATE CONTROL 1 (1977) (suggesting that Congress intentionally did not define tender offer
so that term tender offer could expand to concepts beyond conventional tender offers); J. FLOM,
M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, 1 TAxEovERs AND TAKEOUTS-TENDER OFFERS AND GOING
PRIVATE 27 (1976) (legislative history of Williams Act implies that Act is applicable to
nonconventional tender offers).
37. See, e.g., Midcontinent Bancshares, Inc. v. O'Brien [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 98,734, at 93,709 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (personal solicitations constituted tender offer); SEC. v. Texas Int'l Co., 498 F. Supp. 1231, 1240 (N.D. Iii. 1980) (private offer to purchase
reorganization claims constituted tender offer); Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 826
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (privately negotiated purchases constituted tender offer under SEC multifactor
test); S-G Sec. Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1127 (D. Mass. 1978) (open market
purchases held likely to constitute tender offer); Cattleman's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp.
1248, 1252 (W.D. Okla. 1972) (personal solicitations constituted tender offer). In Cattleman's
Inv. Co. v. Fears,the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma justified
the extension of the scope of the term tender offer to nonconventional tender offers based on
the reasoning that nonconventional tender offers potentially present the same dangers to shareholders
as conventional tender offers present. See Cattleman's Inv. Co., 343 F. Supp. at 1251-52; infra
notes 88-94 and accompanying text (discussing Cattleman's).
38. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (identifying various tests courts use in
determining whether certain activities constitute tender offers).
39. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (explaining confusion concerning
definition and scope of tender offers).
40. See House Hearings, supra note 18, at 14 (describing open market purchases as nontender offer acquisitions); see also infra notes 41-49 and accompanying text (supporting theory
that Congress did not intend Williams Act to regulate open market purchases), But see S-G
Sec. Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co,, 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1126-27 (D, Mass. 1978) (open market purchases
held likely to constitute tender offer).
41. See 113 CONa. REc. 856 (1967). During congressional hearings on the Williams Act,
Senator Williams stated that post-acquisition disclosure for open market and privately negotiated
purchases is preferable to pre-acquisition disclosure so that the disclosure does not interfere
with market forces or the bargaining positions of the negotiators. Id.; House Hearings, supra
note 18, at 14 (describing open market purchases as non-tender offer acquisitions requiring only
post-acquisition disclosure); Senate Report, supra note 5, at 16, 17, 24-25, 36 (distinguishing
open market purchases from tender offers).
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mally proceeds slowly, tender offers usually involve the rapid acquisition of
control and, accordingly, necessitate pre-acquisition disclosure so that target
shareholders can reach informed conclusions whether or not to participate
in a tender offer. 42 Consequently, for the purpose of governing open market
and other similar purchases, the framers of the Williams Act added section
13(d)(1) to the '34 Act which provides that any person acquiring, by any

means, more than five percent of any class of registered equity securities
must disclose certain information to the SEC within ten days of the acquisition. 43 Accordingly, section 13(d)(1) requires corporate equity securities
acquirors to disclose the same information after an acquisition that section
14(d)(1) requires tender offerors to disclose prior to or concurrently with a
tender offer. 44 The different time periods for disclosure under section 14(d)(1)
and 13(d)(1), therefore, effectively demonstrate that45 Congress recognized the
need for early disclosure in tender offer situations.

In addition to the legislative history of the Williams Act, which discredits
extending the scope of the term tender offer to open market purchases of
securities, the inapplicability of sections 14(d)(5)-(7) of the '34 Act to open
market purchases of securities further disfavors regulating open market
purchases of securities as tender offers under the Williams Act.4 For
example, sections 14(d)(5)-(7) of the '34 Act assume the existence of certain
procedures designed to facilitate the tender offer process, including a depo-

sitory in which shares are held until the tender offeror accepts or rejects the
shares. 47 The tender offer depository concept promotes compliance with the

42. See Note, supra note 5, at 1257 (analyzing section 13(d)(1) of the '34 Act in conjunction
with section 14(d)(l) of the '34 Act).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l) (1982). See House Report, supra note 5, at 2818. The House
Report on the Williams Act states that the purpose of section 13(d) is to provide information
to certain groups about an acquiror who has acquired a substantial interest in a company or
who has substantially increased his interest in a company. Id. Section 13(d)(1) also provides
that if the purpose of a purchase is to acquire control, the SEC may require information about
the acquiror's future plans for the company. Id.
44. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982) (outlining information that section 13(d)(l) of the
'34 Act requires purchasers of substantial amounts of corporate securities to provide); 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(d)(l) (1982) (requiring tender offers to disclose information outlined in section 13(d)(1)
of the '34 Act).
45. See Note, supra note 5, at 1257. Congress enacted Section 14(d)(1) of the '34 Act
specifically to require tender offerors to disclose material information contemporaneously with
a tender offer. Id. In the absence of section 14(d)(l), tender offers are subject to the same
disclosure requirements of section 13(d)(1) of the '34 Act that are applicable to all other types
of corporate security purchasers. Id. Thus, Congress recognized a necessity for earlier disclosure
in tender offer situations than in other types of acquisitions. Id.
46. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d)(5)-(7) (1982); see supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text
(explaining functions of sections 14(d)(5)-(7) of the '34 Act); supranotes 28-33 and accompanying
text (demonstrating incompatibility between sections 14(d)(5)-(7) of the '34 Act and open market
purchases).
47. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d)(5)-(7) (1982). Section 14(dX5) of the '34 Act allows a shareholder
who deposits shares in response to a tender offer to withdraw those shares during the first seven
days of an offer or any time after the tender offer has been in effect for 60 days if the tender
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uniform price, shareholder withdrawal and pro rata acceptance provisions
of the Williams Act. In contrast, open market transactions do not involve
depositories and, therefore, are incompatible with the group depository
aspects of tender offers. 4 The incompatibility of the tender offer provisions
of the Williams Act with open market purchases, as well as the legislative
history of the Williams Act, demonstrate that Congress did not contemplate
the application of the scope of the term tender offer to open market
purchases.

49

Despite the arguments against including open market purchases within
the scope of the term tender offer, courts continue to entertain claims that
open market purchases are within the scope of the term tender offer. 0 In
addressing claims arising out of open market purchases under the Williams
Act, some courts apply a multifactor test to determine whether a particular
open market purchase constitutes a tender offer."' Under the multifactor test
the reviewing court determines whether an acquisition constitutes a tender
offer by comparing the characteristics of the transaction with seven factors
normally associated with a conventional tender offer.5 2 The seven factors

offeror already has not acted on the offer. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982). Section 14(d)(6) of
the '34 Act requires the tender offeror to accept the shares pro rata if more shares than the
tender offeror sought are deposited within 10 days of the commencement of the tender offer.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(dX6) (1982). Section 14(d)(7) of the '34 Act requires the tender offeror to pay
an equal price for all shares accepted pursuant to the tender offer. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7).
Sections 14(d)(5)-(7) of the '34 Act, therefore, necessitate a deposit period of several days
between the time that the shareholders deposit the securities in accordance with the tender offer
and the time when the securities are either accepted or rejected by the tender offeror. See 15
U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5)-(7) (1982).
48. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1207 (2d Cir.
1978). The withdrawal provision, the pro rata acceptance provision, and the equal price provision
of the Williams Act are inapplicable to open market purchases for three reasons. Id. First, open
market sellers cannot withdraw shares from sale after the shares have been relinquished. Id.
Secondly, open market purchasers are unable to accept shares on a pro rata basis. Id. Finally,
open market purchasers cannot realize more than the market price per share of stock on the
open market. Id.
49. See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text (supporting proposition that Congress
did not intend Williams Act to apply to open market purchasers).
50. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 57-60 (2d Cir. 1985)
(addressing whether five privately negotiated purchases and one open market purchase constituted tender offer); SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945, 950-53 (9th Cir.
1985) (addressing whether open market purchases constituted tender offer); Polinsky v. MCA
Inc., 680 F.2d 1286, 1291 (9th Cir. 1982) (same); Ludlow Corp. v. Tyco Labs, Inc., 529 F.
Supp. 62, 66-68 (D. Mass. 1981) (same); LTV Corp. v. Grumman Corp., 526 F. Supp. 106,
109-10 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (same); S-G Sec., Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1123-27
(D. Mass. 1978) (same).
51. See SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945, 950-53 (9th Cir. 1985)
(open market purchases did not constitute tender offer under multifactor test); Polinsky v.
MCA, Inc., 680 F.2d 1286, 1291 (9th Cir. 1982) (same); Ludlow Corp. v. Tyco Labs, Inc., 529
F. Supp. 62, 67 (D. Mass. 1981) (same); infra text accompanying notes 52-55 (discussing
multifactor test).
52. See SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945, 950-52 (9th Cir. 1985).
The Carter Hawley Hale Stores court examined open market repurchases of securities against
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which are characteristic of a conventional tender offer are as follows: active
and widespread solicitation of a corporation's shareholders; offer at a premium
price; firm rather than negotiable terms of the offer; offer contingent on the
tender of a certain number of shares; offer that is open for a limited period
of time; offer that subjects shareholders to pressure to sell stock; and offer
preceded by a public announcement of the offeror's intent to gain control. 3
Courts that employ the multifactor test need not find any specific number
of characteristics in an acquisition to conclude that the acquisition constitutes
a tender offer. 4 Rather, a court's inquiry under the multifactor test must be
flexible enough to assess qualitatively the specific factors involved in the
transaction at hand.55
In SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc.,5 6 for example, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied the multifactor test in
considering whether Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc.'s (CHH) repurchase of
over fifty percent of the outstanding shares of CHH constituted a tender
offer. s7 In Carter Hawley Hale Stores, the Limited, Inc. (Limited) made a
cash tender offer for twenty million shares, or fifty-five percent, of the
outstanding shares of CHH.5 s After CHH publicly announced that Limited's
offer was not in the best interest of CHH or its shareholders, CHH instituted
an open market repurchase program for fifteen million shares of CHH
common stock.5 9 Under the repurchase program, CHH acquired over fifty
percent of the outstanding common stock of CHH before Limited was able
to legally purchase any of the shares tendered pursuant to the tender offer. 6°
Limited revised and eventually withdrew the original tender offer. 6' Subsequent to Limited's withdrawal of its tender offer, the SEC instituted proceedings for injunctive relief against CHH in the United States District Court
for the Central District of California alleging that the CHH repurchase

each of eight factors of the multifactor test and found that the purchases did not possess any

of the factors which characterize conventional tender offers. Id.
53. Id. at 950.
54. Id.
55. See Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (determinative
value of particular multifactor test factor depends on facts of transaction).
56. 760 F.2d 945 (1985).
57. Id. at 947-53; see infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text (addressing issue whether
Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc. (CCH) repurchases program constituted tender offer).
58. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, 760 F.2d at 946.
59. See id. In Carter Hawley Hale Stores, CHH announced intention to repurchase as
many as 15,000,000 shares of CHH stock at an aggregate price of $500,000 or less. Id. The
CHH repurchase program was part of an elaborate scheme to defeat Limited's offer to purchase
shares of CHH stock. Id, In connection with the scheme, CHH sold a substantial percentage

of CHH preferred shares to General Cinema Corporation (General Cinema) and granted General
Cinema an option to purchase a lucrative CHH subsidiary. Id. CHH anticipated that General
Cinema would represent one-third of the voting shares of CHH if the repurchase program

succeeded. Id.
60. Id. at 947.
61. Id.
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program constituted an illegal tender offer, 62 The district court denied the
SEC's motion for a preliminary injunction on the ground that the SEC had
failed to establish the likelihood that the CHH63 repurchase program constituted a tender offer under the multifactor test.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court ruling after a careful
analysis of the CHH repurchase program under the multifactor test 64 The
Carter Hawley Hale Stores court found that the CHH repurchase program
did not involve an active and widespread solicitation of shareholders and,
thus, did not involve solicitation for a substantial percentage of CHH
shares." The Ninth Circuit also found that the CHH repurchase offer was
not conditioned upon the acquisition of a certain number of shares, did not
involve a premium price or fixed terms, and was not open for only a limited
period of time, 6 In considering whether the shareholder pressure factor was
present, the Ninth Circuit found that, although the shareholders experienced
pressure, market forces, not CHH, were the cause of pressure on the
shareholders. 67 The Ninth Circuit conceded, however, that the CHH repurchase program involved a public announcement of intent to acquire stock
followed by a large acquisition of stock and, therefore, met one factor of
the multifactor test. 8 The Carter Hawley Hale Stores court affirmed the
district court decision finding that the CHH repurchase program did not

62, See SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 587 F. Supp, 1248, 1251 (C,D. Cal,
1984) (SEC sought to enjoin further stock repurchases and to obtain preliminary injunctive
relief requiring CHH to transfer the repurchased stock to trustees for voting purposes). The
SEC alleged that the CHH repurchase program amounted to a tender offer in violation of
section 13(e)(1) of the '34 Act which governs issuer repurchases of securities, Id,
63. Id. at 1252-56, The United States District Court for the Central District of California
in CarterHawley Hale Stores found that the repurchase program did not constitute a tender
offer under the multifactor test. Id. In denying the motion for a preliminary injunction, the
district court refused to consider the tender offer identification test proposed in S-G Securities
Inc. v. Fuqua Investment Co.. Id. See S-G Sec. v. Fuqua Inv, Co,, 466 F. Supp. 1114 (D.
Mass. 1978) (explaining S-G test); supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text (explaining S-G

test),
64. See SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945, 950-52 (9th Cir. 1985);
infra notes 65.69 and accompanying text (court's analysis of whether CHH open market
repurchase program constituted tender offer).
65. See Carter Hawley Hale Stores, 760 F.2d at 950 (CHH did not directly solicit any
shareholders and did not indirectly solicit shareholders through publicity concerning repurchase
program).
66, See id, at 951. The CarterHawley Hale Stores court found that since CHH engaged
in many transactions at various prices, the terms of the repurchase offer were not firm in the
sense that negotiation could not take place, Id, The court also determined that a "premium"
price normally is measured in relation to market price and that CHH's repurchases at the
market price, therefore, were not made at a premium. Id. In addition, the court found the
repurchases were not contingent on the tender of a fixed number of shares and that CHH did
not set a limited time period for the offer, Id.
67, See id. at 952, The Ninth Circuit in Carter Hawley Hale Stores, found that the
pressure on shareholders to tender shares to CHH resulted from market forces rather than the
CHH repurchase program. Id,
68. Id.
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constitute a tender offer according to the tender offer characteristics specified
in the multifactor test. 69 In accordance with the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Carter Hawley Hale Stores, most courts that have applied the multifactor
test have concluded that open market purchases generally do not possess the
70
characteristics indicative of a conventional tender offer.
As an alternative to the multifactor test, for determining whether open
market purchases constitute tender offers,7 ' the United States District Court
2
for the District of Massachusetts in S-G Securities v. Fuqua Investment Co.
adopted a test that examines solely whether a public announcement of intent
to gain control of a corporation has been followed by rapid substantial open
market and privately negotiated purchases. 73 In S-G Securities, Fuqua Investment Company, Inc. (Fuqua) entered into negotiations with the board
of directors of S-G Securities, Inc. (S-G) in an attempt to gain control of SG through either a merger or a tender offer.7 4 After S-G's board of directors
rejected Fuqua's proposals, Fuqua publicly announced its intent to acquire
control of S-G.75 Fuqua then purchased twenty-eight percent of the outstand76
ing shares of S-G through privately negotiated and open market purchases.
77
Fuqua, however, did not comply with section 14(d) of the '34 Act. S-G
petitioned the district court for a preliminary injunction to enjoin Fuqua
from voting the shares that Fuqua had purchased and from purchasing
additional shares of S-G on the grounds that Fuqua's purchases constituted
an illegal tender offer under section 14(d) of the '34 Act.7 8 Since Fuqua had

69. Id. The Carter Hawley Hale Stores court found that none of the traditional seven
tender offer characteristics were present in the CHH repurchase program. Id. The presence of
the eighth factor, a public announcement made prior to the repurchase program, did not justify,
in the court's opinion, characterizing the program as a tender offer. Id.
70. See id. at 950-53 (open market purchases did not constitute tender offer under
multifactor test); Polinsky v. MCA, Inc., 680 F.2d 1286, 1291 (9th Cir. 1982) (same); Ludlow
Corp. v. Tyco Labs, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 62, 67 (D. Mass. 1981) (same); Brascan Ltd. v. Edper
Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 791-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (criticizing multifactor test but finding
that open market purchases would not constitute tender offer even if multifactor test applied).
71. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text (explaining multifactor test).
72. 466 F. Supp. 1114 (D. Mass. 1978).
73. Id. at 1126-27. See infra text accompanying note 81 (S-G Securities court reasoned
that public announcement of intent to acquire control followed by rapid stock acquisitions
pressures target shareholders into selling stock); see also Esmark Inc. v. Strode [1981-1982
Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. RaP. 98,238, at 91,581 (Ky. Cr. APP. 1981) (applying S-G test).
See generally Note, Expansion of the Williams Act: Tender Offer Regulation for Nonconventional Purchases, 11 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 277, 277-96 (examining S-G Securities case).
74. S-G Sec., 466 F. Supp. at 1119.
75. See id. at 1119 (Fuqua published press releases which reported Fuqua's intent to
acquire substantial amount of S-G stock).
76. See id. at 119-21. In S-G Securities, Fuqua purchased 28%, or approximately 400,000
shares, of S-G stock in six large block purchases. Id. Fuqua bought approximately 285,000
shares of S-G stock on the open market and approximately 115,000 shares of stock through
privately negotiated purchases. Id.
77. Id. at 1124; see supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text (explaining requirements of
sections 14(d)(1), (5)-(7) of '34 Act).

78. See S-G Sec., 466 F. Supp. at I110.
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made a public announcement of intent to gain control of S-G and subsequently made substantial purchases of S-G stock on the open market and
through private negotiations, the district court held that S-G demonstrated
a likelihood of prevailing on the claim that Fuqua's open market purchases
constituted a tender offer within the meaning of the Williams Act.7 9 The

district court reasoned that a public announcement of intent to acquire
control of a company, followed by rapid acquisitions of the stock of that
company, exert pressures upon target shareholders of the type that Congress

intended the Williams Act to prevent.8 0 Under the S-G Securities test,
therefore, large open market purchases are susceptible to characterization as
tender offers if preceded by a purchaser's announcement of intent to acquire
control of the target corporation. 8'
Although courts continue to entertain claims that open market purchases
constitute tender offers, the history of these allegations in the courts suggests
that most courts are not receptive to the extension of the scope of the term

tender offer to include open market purchases. 8 2 To the extent that the S-G

Securities case contradicts the general tendency among courts, the case

remains something of an anomaly to judicial decisions on the subject of the
applicability of the Williams Act to open market purchases.8

3

The refusal of

the judiciary to apply the tender offer provisions of the Williams Act to
open market purchases is justified in light of the legislative history and the
statutory framework of the Williams Act. 84

79. Id. at 1126-27. The S-G Securities court examined the legislative history of the
Williams Act and prior judicial interpretations of section 14(d) of the '34 Act. Id. at 1124-26.
80. See id. at 1126. Despite the finding of the S-G Securities court that S-G demonstrated
a likelihood of prevailing on the claim that Fuqua's actions constituted an illegal tender offer
under section 14(d) of the '34 Act, the district court declined to grant S-G's motion for a
preliminary injunction on the ground that S-G had failed to demonstrate irreparable injury to
S-G shareholders. Id. at 1127-29. The S-G Securities court, instead, enjoined Fuqua from
purchasing additional S-G shares through means other than a tender offer and also enjoined
Fuqua from voting the shares that Fuqua had acquired without first offering recission to the
uninformed shareholders from whom Fuqua had purchased the S-G shares. Id. at 1129.
81. See id. at 1126-27.
82. See SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945, 953 (9th Cir. 1985) (open
market purchases do not constitute tender offer); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright
Corp., 582 F.2d 1195, 1207 (2d Cir. 1978) (legislative history of Williams Act suggests that
tender offer rules are not applicable to open market purchases); Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F.
Supp. 783, 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (same); Water & Wall Assoc., Inc. v. American Consumer
Indus., Inc. [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,943, AT 93,759 (D.N.J. 1973)
(sAmE); supra notes 50-51, 71-73 (discussing judicial treatment of claims that open market
purchases constitute tender offers).
83. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (judicial decisions refuse to extend scope of
term tender offer to open market purchases).
84. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text (inapplicability of sections 14(d)(5)-(7)
of the '34 Act to open market purchases); supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text (discussing
legislative history of Williams Act); supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing judicial
reluctance to hold that open market purchases constitute tender offer). But see S-G Sec. v.
Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1127 (D. Mass. 1978) (finding that open market purchases
likely to constitute tender offer).
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PRIVATELY NEGOTIATED TRANSACTIONS

Courts generally agree that privately negotiated transactions, which
typically involve a buyer and a seller negotiating stock purchase terms directly
with one another, are susceptible to categorization as tender offers for the
purposes of the Williams Act.8 Unlike open market purchases, private
negotiations for the sale of securities may involve many of the characteristics
associated with conventional tender offers and, therefore, may cause the
pressured, ill-informed target shareholder decisions that Congress sought to
prevent through adoption of the Williams Act.16 The United States District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma in Cattleman'sInvestment Co.
v. Fears7 first extended the term tender offer to private negotiations for the
purchase of securities.88 In Cattleman's Investment Co., the defendant,
George Fears, solicited many of the National Pioneer Insurance Company's
(Pioneer) shareholders for the purpose of purchasing shares of Pioneer's
stock.8 9 Fears, however, did not comply with any of the Williams Act tender
offer provisions." The Cattleman'scourt held that Fears' solicitation activity

85. See Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 57 (2d Cir. 1985) (individual
purchases may constitute tender offer if shareholders need Williams Act information); MidContinent Bancshares, Inc. v. O'Brien [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,734,
at 93,709 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (widespread private solicitations at premium for substantial block
of stock constituted tender offer); Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F, Supp. 783, 826 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (purchase of substantial amount of stock from 39 individuals and institutions constituted
tender offer); Hoover Co. v. Fuqua Indus., Inc. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 97,107, at 96,145 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (solicitation of over 100 family members for more
than 40% of a company's stock constituted a tender offer); Cattleman's Inv. Co. v. Fears,
343 F. Supp. 1248, 1252 (W.D. Okla. 1972) (widespread solicitation of shareholders constituted
tender offer).
86. See Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 824-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1069 (1983). The district court in Wellman v. Dickinson, employing the multifactor
test, found that seven of the eight characteristics traditionally associated with a tender offer
were present in the privately negotiated purchases at issue. Id. The Wellman court also
distinguished privately negotiated purchases from open market purchases by recognizing that
the application of the Williams Act to privately negotiated purchases, unlike the application of
the Williams Act to open market purchases, does not render sections 14(d)(5)-(7) unworkable.
See id. at 822. The Wellman court explained that Wellman involved only privately negotiated
purchases while Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. involved, in addition to
privately negotiated purchases, open market purchases which could not adapt to procedural
aspects of the Williams Act tender offers provisions. Id., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. CurtissWright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1207 (2d Cir. 1978) supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text
(explaining incompatibility between open market transactions and sections 14(d)(5)-(7) of '34
Act).
87. 343 F. Supp, 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
88. See Cattleman's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248, 1252 (W.D. Okla. 1972) (active
and widespread solicitation of shareholders constituted tender offer).
89, See id. at 1251-52. In Cattleman's Investment Co. v. Fears, the defendant solicited
several of the Cattleman's Investment Co. (Cattleman's) shareholders for the purchase of their

stock. Id. The defendant's purchases in Cattleman's Investment Co, resulted in ownership of
more than 5% of the outstanding shares of Cattleman's Investment Co. Id.
90. Id. at 1252.
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constituted a tender offer because Fears' widespread solicitation of target
shareholders caused the target shareholders to make hurried investment
decisions without access to material information concerning the proposed
offering. 91 The court reasoned that Fears' solicitation of Pioneer's shareholders exposed the target shareholders to the dangers that Congress designed
the Williams Act to prevent. 92 In applying the Williams Act tender offer
93
provisions to a transaction beyond the scope of a conventional tender offer,
the Cattleman's court provided a foundation for the establishment of the
multifactor test which further extended the scope of the Williams Act tender
offer provisions to encompass privately negotiated purchases. 94
Although the Cattleman's case provided the foundation for the application of the multifactor test to private negotiations for the sale of securities,
one of the earliest specific judicial articulations of the multifactor test
appeared in Wellman v. Dickinson.9s In Wellman, Sun Company (Sun)
sought to gain control of Becton, Dickinson & Company (BD) through

privately negotiated purchases of BD's shares. 96 Sun solicited thirty-nine

individual and institutional BD shareholders located throughout the country
for the purpose of purchasing BD stock.97 Sun offered the BD shareholders

a premium for shares of BD but did not permit negotiation concerning the
offering price or the terms of the offer. 9 Sun also imposed time constraints
and pressures on the BD shareholders to tender their shares and conditioned
the offer on the tender of a certain number of shares. 99 Despite the condi91. See id. at 1251. In the Cattleman'scase, the district court found that the clear purpose
of the Williams Act is to provide material information and time to shareholders faced with
control-related tender offers, as well as to ensure that the tender offeror treats all target
shareholders fairly. Id. The defendant's actions conflicted with the purposes of the Williams
Act because the defendant's active solicitation of the Cattleman's Investment Co. shareholders
pressured the shareholders to make uninformed, hurried investment decisions of the sort that
Congress designed the Williams Act to prevent. Id. at 1252. In failing to comply with the
Williams Act tender offer provisions, the defendant, Fears, also deprived the Cattleman's
shareholders of the equal protection provisions of section 14(d) of the '34 Act. Id.
92. Id.; see supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text (purpose of Williams Act tender
offer provisions).
93. See Cattleman's Inv. Co., 343 F. Supp. at 1252 (private negotiations constituted
tender offer).
94. See id. (private soliciations constituted tender offer); Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F.
Supp. 783, 825 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983). The Wellman court found
that private negotiations for the purchase of stock constitute a tender offer. Id. The Wellman
court not only accepted the Cattleman's court's proposition that private negotiations may
constitute tender offers but also articulated a multifactor test for use in determining whether
privately negotiated transactions actually constitute a tender offer. Id.
95. Wellman, 475 F. Supp. at 825 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see supra text accompanying note 53
(identifying multifactor test factors).
96. See Wellman, 475 F. Supp. at 824. (The defendant, solicited over 34% of the
outstanding BD stock from over 39 individuals and institutions).
97. See id. (Sun solicited of more than 3456 of the outstanding BD stock from shareholders
located in areas from New York to California and from Massachusetts to North Carolina).
98. Id. (defendant structured purchases so there would be no individual negotiation).
99. See id. at 822, 824-25 (defendant conditioned offer on the acquisition of 20%o of the
outstanding shares of BD).
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tional terms of Sun's offer, Sun did not comply with the tender offer
provisions of the Williams Act."°
In considering the claim that Sun's purchases constituted a tender offer,
the Wellman court recognized that Sun's offer possessed all of the characteristics of a conventional tender offer as described in the legislative history
of the Williams Act.' 0' The Wellman court next considered the seven characteristics of a tender offer that the SEC provided for the court in an amicus
curiae brief. 0 2 The factors that the SEC suggested were characteristic of a
tender offer provide the basis for the multifactor test: active and widespread
solicitation of shareholders; solicitation for a substantial percentage of stock;
offer at a premium price; offer contingent upon the tender of a specific
number of shares; offer based on fixed terms; offer open for a limited period
of time; and pressure on shareholders to tender stock. 03 The Wellman court
compared the multifactor description of a tender offer with Sun's offer and
determined that Sun's offer possessed all seven factors specified in the SEC
multifactor description of a tender offer.1 4 The Wellman court, therefore,
concluded that Sun's offer constituted a tender offer in violation of section
14(d) of the '34 Act.' 5
Although the Wellman decision demonstrates an application of the
multifactor test to a privately negotiated transaction which amounted to a
tender offer, 06 other courts have applied some factors of the multifactor test
to privately negotiated securities transactions and have found that no tender

offer existed.10 7 For example, the United States District Court for the District
100. Id. at 826.
101. See id. at 822-23. The Wellman court found that Sun's purchases involved several of
the traditional characteristics of a conventional tender offer inciuding a bid, a premium price,
and a obligation to purchase all or a specific number of shares if certain conditions were met.
Id.
102. See id. at 823-25 (identifying several factors that SEC suggests are characteristic of
tender offer).
103. Id. at 823-24.
104. See id. at 824-25 (analyzing private purchases under multifactor test). Compare supra
notes 98-100 and accompanying text (factual breakdown of privately negotiated purchases in
Wellman) with text accompanying note 103 supra (multifactor test factors). The purchases in
Wellman possessed all of the SEC enunciated multifactor test characteristics. See Wellman, 475
F. Supp. at 824-25.
105. See Wellman, 475 F. Supp. at 826 (purchases of stock involved important characteristics of tender offers).
106. See id. (privately negotiated purchases constituted tender offer).
107. See, e.g., Astronics Corp. v. Protective Closures Co., Inc., 561 F. Supp. 329, 335
(W.D.N.Y. 1983) (private sales not likely to constitute tender offer under multifactor test);
University Bank and Trust Co. v. Gladstone [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 99,594, at 97,343 (D. Mass. 1983) (solicitation of 22% of a corporation's stock from 49
shareholders did not constitute tender offer); Gilbert v. Bagley, 492 F. Supp. 714, 731 (M.D.N.C.
1980) (offer to purchase securities at a fixed price did not constitute tender offer); Stromfield
v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 484 F. Supp. 1264, 1272 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (offer to seven
shareholders to purchase stock at a premium did not constitute tender offer); Panter v. Marshall
Field & Co. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,299, AT 97,059 (N.D.
ILL. 1980) (offer to purchase shares of stock subject to condition precedent did not constitute
tender offer).
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of Massachusetts, when confronted with a transaction possessing only three
of the factors of the multifactor test, concluded that the factors characteristic
of tender offers which were absent outweighed the factors characteristic of
tender offers that were present in the transaction. '0 As a comparison of the
cases applying the multifactor test to privately negotiated transactions suggests, whether a court concludes that a privately negotiated transaction
constitutes a tender offer under the multifactor test will depend upon the
specific facts involved in a unique privately negotiated transaction13 9
Despite the judiciary's widespread acceptance of the multifactor test, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Hanson Trust
PLC v. SCM Corp.,' O recently criticized the multifactor test and, instead,
proposed and employed a shareholder identification test for ascertaining
whether a privately negotiated securities purchase constitutes a tender offer. '
In Hanson Trust, Hanson Trust, PLC and certain of its affiliates (Hanson
Trust) made five privately negotiated purchases and one open market purchase of SCM Corporation's (SCM) stock and, thereby, acquired twenty12
five percent of SCM's outstanding stock within a two hour period. SCM
then applied to the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York for a temporary restraining order prohibiting Hanson Trust from

108. See University Bank and Trust Co. v. Gladstone [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED.
AT 97,343 (D. MAss. 1984). IN University Bank and Trust Co. v.
Gladstone, a University Bank and Trust Company (Bank) shareholder, who owned approximately 19% of Bank's outstanding shares, privately solicited options to purchase an additional
22qo of Bank's outstanding shares. Id. at 97,343. Bank brought suit, alleging that the shareholder
had engaged in a tender offer that violated sections 14(d) and 14(e) of the '34 Act. Id. at
97,342. The district court held that the shareholder's solicitations did not constitute a tender
offer based on the following reasons-the shareholder had not made a public announcement of
intent to acquire a substantial amount of Bank stock prior to the solicitations, the terms of the
offer were negotiable, the offer was not contingent upon the tender of a certain number of
shares, and the tender offer did not involve pressure tactics directed toward the shareholders.
Id. at 94,343. The district court found that the absence of certain tender offer characteristics
outweighed the few tender offer characteristics that were present in the offer. Id. Specifically,
the court recognized that the offer involved an active and widespread solicitation of shareholders
for the purchase of a large block of securities at a premium price. Id.
109. See supra notes 102-108 and accompanying text (demonstrating fact-specificity of
multifactor test when applied to privately negotiated transactions).
110. 774 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1985).
111. See id. at 57. The shareholder identification test enunciated in Hanson Trust focuses
on the target shareholders' need for the information that section 14(d)(1) of the Williams Act
provides in a tender offer context. Id. If an offer presents the likelihood that, unless a section
14(d)(1) disclosure is made, target shareholders will lack the information needed to consider the
offer, the offer constitutes a tender offer under the shareholder identification test. Id.
112. See id. at 52-53. In Hanson Trust, Hanson Trust made open market and privately
negotiated purchases subsequent to a former tender offer by Hanson Trust for SCM shares. Id.
at 51-53. Hanson Trust withdrew the tender offer in response to actions taken by SCM which
prevented Hanson Trust from successfully completing the tender offer. Id. SCM shareholders
who desired to sell their SCM stock initiated four of the five subsequent Hanson Trust privately
negotiated purchases. Id. at 52-53. The purchases involved no direct Hanson Trust solicitation.
Id.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,594,
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making additional purchases of SCM's stock." 3 The district court granted

the temporary restraining order, accepting SCM's contention that Hanson
Trust's purchases constituted a tender offer in contravention of the Williams
4
Act. "
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
noted that the district court did not rely on a particular established test to
define the term tender offer and reversed the district court decision on the

grounds that Hanson Trust did not purchase SCM's stock in connection with
a tender offer." 5 In choosing a proper test to apply in determining whether
certain activity constitutes a tender offer, the Hanson Trust court stated that
complete reliance on the multifactor test to determine whether a transaction
must comply with the tender offer provisions of the Williams Act is unwise
because the factors of the test may not be determinative of whether a
particular transaction constitutes a tender offer. ' 6 The Hanson Trust court
argued that some transactions involving only a few of the multifactor test's

factors constitute tender offers while some transactions involving many of
the test's factors are not tender offers." 7 As an alternative to the multifactor

test, the Hanson Trust court adopted a shareholder identification test." 8
Under the shareholder identification test, an offer to purchase shares of a
target corporation constitutes a tender offer only when the pre-acquisition
disclosure of section 14(d)(1) of the Williams Act is necessary for the target
shareholders to make an informed investment decision." 9 The Hanson Trust
court, applying the shareholder identification test, recognized that five of
the six shareholders that Hanson Trust had solicited were sophisticated

113. See Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 617 F. Supp. 832, 834 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd 774
F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1995). SCM argued that the district court should enjoin further Hanson Trust
purchases because Hanson Trust's purchases amounted to an illegal de facto continuation of
Hanson Trust's earlier tender offer. Id.
114. See id. The district court in Hanson Trust, however, did not specify the standard that
the court used to determine that the purchases constituted a tender offer. Id.
115. See Hanson Trust v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 57 (2d Cir. 1985) (purchases not made
pursuant to tender offer as defined in shareholder identification test).
116. Id. at 57. The Second Circuit in Hanson Trust suggested that the characteristics of a
tender offer, specified in the multifactor test, are not determinative of whether a particular
transaction constitutes a tender offer. Id. The court argued that some tender offers possess a
few of the tender offer characteristics identified in the multifactor test while some non-tender
offer activities possess many of the tender offer characteristics. Id. Thus, the Second Circuit
opined that the multifactor test is unreliable. Id. But see id. at 57-58 (finding that even under
multifactor test Hanson Trust's purchases did not constitute tender offer).
117. Id. at 57.
118. Id. .The Hanson Trust court modeled the shareholder identification test on the
principals applied in SEC v. Ralston PurinaCo. and Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright
Corp. Id. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 127 (1953) (applicability of a particular
section of Securities Exchange Act of 1933 ('33 Act) depends upon whether protection of '33
Act is needed); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1206 (2d Cir.
1978) (determination of applicability of Williams Act depends on statutory purpose); infra text
accompanying note 120 (description of shareholder identification test).
119. See Hanson Trust, 774 F.2d at 57 (description of shareholders identification test);
supra note Il1 and accompanying text (explaining shareholder identification test).
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institutional investors who had access to material information and, therefore,
were not members of the class that Congress sought to protect through the
enactment of the Williams Act. 20 Thus,the Second Circuit held that Hanson
Trust's privately negotiated purchases of SCM stock did not constitute a
tender offer since the shareholders in Hanson Trust did not need the
information required under section 14(d)(1) of the '34 Act to make an
informed investment decision concerning the sale of SCM stock. 2
After Hanson Trust, courts in the Second Circuit most likely will base
their determination of whether a particular privately negotiated purchase
constitutes a tender offer on the target shareholders' sophistication and the
target shareholders' access to information that section 14(d) of the '34 Act
requires for disclosure.'2 The Hanson Trust decision suggests that the sole
purpose of the Williams Act is to provide target shareholders with material
information that will aid the shareholders in reaching an informed investment
decision in the context of a tender offer.'2 While the tender offer provisions
of the Williams Act seek to provide shareholders with material information, 2 4
the provisions also seek to ensure evenhanded treatment of shareholders and
to provide shareholders with the time necessary to make an informed
investment decision.' In light of the various purposes of the Williams Act, the
Second Circuit's shareholder identification test is flawed because the test
acknowledges only the Williams Act's purpose of providing information to
the uniformed target shareholder and does not consider the Williams Act's
purposes of providing time and equal treatment to target shareholders in
tender offer situations.'2 6 Although target shareholders' need for information

120. See Hanson Trust, 774 F.2d at 57. The Hanson Trust court found that five of the six
sellers were highly sophisticated professionals and were aware of the information necessary to
make an informed decision to sell. Id. Furthermore, the court found that the sellers had access
to such information as Hanson Trust's section 14(d)(1) disclosure made in connection with a
prior tender offer, Hanson Trust's amendment to the original offer, and press releases concerning
SCM's responses to the formal Hanson Trust tender offer. Id. at 57-58.
121. Id.
122. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text (discussing Second Circuit's adoption
of shareholder identification test).
123. See Hanson Trust, 774 F.2d at 57 (stating that purpose of section 14(d) of '34 Act is
to provide disclosure of information to uninformed investors).
124. See 15 U.S.C. 78n(d)(1) (1982) (requiring disclosure of certain information to target
shareholders in tender offer situations); House Report, supra note 5, at 2813-14 (one purpose
of Williams Act is to provide information to target shareholders); supra notes 25-27 and
accompanying text (purpose of section 14(d)(1) of '34 Act).
125. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5)-(7) (1982) (providing time and equal treatment to shareholder
solicitees in tender offer situations); House Report, supra note 5, at 2820-21 (Williams Act
designed to protect tender offer shareholders from pressure and prejudice); supra notes 28-33
and accompanying text (explaining sections 14(d)(5)-(7) of '34 Act).
126. See Hanson Trust v. SCM-Death of the Williams Act?, N.Y.L.J. Dec. 9, 1985 at
44, col. 2 (explaining that Hanson Trust decision does not recognize purposes of the Williams
Act other than the purpose of providing disclosure of information) [hereinafter cited as Death
of the Williams Act].
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about a tender offer is important, 2 7 the disclosure of material information
alone is not sufficient to ensure informed, unhurried decision-making when
tender offerors pressure target shareholders to tender shares hastily at the
risk of discrimination. 2 Courts, therefore, should not depend solely upon
a specific privately
the shareholder identification test to determine whether
29
negotiated transaction constitutes a tender offer.
A solution to the conflict concerning the proper test to use in determining
which offers to purchase securities constitute tender offers lies with a
modified multifactor test.3 0 Although Hanson Trust rejects the quantitative
aspects of the multifactor test, '3' the multifactor test's flexibility enables
courts to effectively inquire into whether a specific activity resembles a tender
offer for the purpose of the Williams Act. 132 The multifactor test, however,
fails to give due consideration to the needs of the target shareholders to
obtain information about a tender offer. 3 3 A modification of the multifactor
test to include the shareholders identification test would enable courts to
determine more reliably which activities constitute tender offers for the
purposes of the Williams Act. 3 4 Under a modified multifactor test, a
reviewing court first should apply the multifactor test to determine whether
a certain activity involves the characteristics of a conventional tender offer.
Secondly, the court should investigate whether an activity that does not
constitute a tender offer under the multifactor test nonetheless should comply
with the Williams Act tender offer provisions because of the shareholders'

127. See House Hearings, supra note 18, at 11-13 (discussing importance of disclosing
material information in tender offer situations); supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text
(shareholders' need for disclosure of material information).
128. See Death of the Williams Act?, supra note 126. Although the SCM shareholders in
Hanson Trust were not in need of material information, Hanson Trust's offer did not accord
equal treatment to all SCM shareholders. Id. Market professionals with access to specialized
stock information sources determined that Hanson Trust was willing to purchase large amounts
of SCM stock. Id. Other SCM shareholders without access to specialized information operated
at a severe disadvantage since those shareholders did not know that Hanson Trust was a willing
purchaser of SCM stock. Id. If Hanson Trust had complied with the Williams Act tender offer
provisions, all SCM shareholders would have had access to the same information and, thereby,
would have been treated equally. Id.
129. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text (explaining flaw in shareholder identification test).
130. See infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text (explaining needed modification of
multifactor test).
131. See Hanson Trust, 774 F.2d at 57 (arguing that quantity of factors present in
transactions is not determinative of whether transaction constitutes tender offer).
132. See SEC v. Caner Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945, 953 (9th Cir. 1985)
(multifactor test reflects multiple congressional concerns about tender offers); supra notes 10408 and accompanying text (demonstrating fact-specificity and flexibility of multifactor test).
133. See SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d at 945, 950-52 (9th Cir. 1985)
(listing factors examined through application of eight-factor version of multifactor test). The
tender offer shareholders' need for information is not one of the factors examined under the
multifactor test. See id.
134. See infra notes 135-36 and accompanying text (explaining proposed modified multifactor test).
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need for information, time, and equal treatment under the Williams Act.

35

A two tier test which examines both the form of an offer and the tendering
shareholders' need for information about the offer, would recognize all the
goals of the Williams Act while providing36 a flexible, effective standard for
use in the identification of tender offers.
The scope of the definition of the term tender offer under the Williams
Act remains elusive.' 37 Although courts do not apply actively the Williams
Act tender offer provisions to open market purchases,' 31 most courts recognize the applicability of the Williams Act tender offer provisions to those
privately negotiated transactions which present many of the dangers that the
Williams Act seeks to eliminate. 3 9 Although no particular test for identifying
Williams Act tender offers has commanded uniform acceptance, the multifactor test and the shareholder identification test each further an important,
yet limited, aspect of the Williams Act.' 40 A two tier test which addresses
whether an offer to purchase securities possesses characteristics traditionally
associated with conventional tender offers and, also, whether the target
shareholders solicited in the offer need the protection of the Williams Act

tender offer provisions would provide a valuable method for determining
which activities should comply with the tender offer provisions of the
Williams Act. 4' Realization of the ultimate goal of the Williams Act, to
protect target shareholders in the context of tender offer contests for

135. See Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 823-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (explaining
multifactor test), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983); House Report, supra note 5, at 2812-14
(one purpose of section 14(d)(1) of '34 Act is to provide uninformed shareholders with
information about tender offer).
136. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.s. 119, 124-25 (1953) (examining statutory
purpose of securities legislation to determine applicability of securities legislation to specific
types of transactions); Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 823-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(considering whether activity presents same dangers as conventional tender offers to determine
if Congress meant to regulate that activity through the Williams Act), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1069 (1983); Death of the Williams Act?, supra note 126, at 44, col. 2-3 (possibility exists that
activity will not constitute tender offer under multifactor test yet will warrant application of
the Williams Act).
137. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (listing various tests courts use to identify
tender offers).
138. See supra notes 41-49, 70 and accompanying text (discussing judicial reluctance to
find that open market purchases constitute tender offers).
139. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (demonstrating judicial recognition that
private negotiations for purchase of stock may constitute tender offer).
140. See Hanson Trust, 744 F.2d at 57 (2d Cir. 1985) (shareholder identification test
recognizes statutory purpose of Williams Act to provide disclosure of material information to
uninformed shareholders); Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 823-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(multifactor test recognizes intent of Congress to regulate conventional tender offers); see also
House Hearings,supra note 8, at 11-14 (statutory purpose of Williams Act not only to provide
disclosure of information but also to provide time for target shareholders to make informed
decisions whether to tender shares and to provide equal treatment to target shareholders in
tender offer situations).
141. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text (discussing dual components of
modified multifactor tender offer test).

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[V/ol. 43:901

control, 42 is possible only through the employment of a flexible, complete
standard which will identify those solicitations and purchases that Congress
meant to govern under the Williams Act.
CHARLENE WENDY CHRISTOF.IS

142. See House Reports, supra note 5, at 2812-14 (purpose of Williams Act is lo protect
"target shareholders faced with tender offers).

